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Abstract
Network coding based peer-to-peer streaming represents an effective solution
to aggregate user capacities and to increase system throughput in live multimedia
streaming. Nonetheless, such systems are vulnerable to pollution attacks where
a handful of malicious peers can disrupt the communication by transmitting just
a few bogus packets which are then recombined and relayed by unaware honest
nodes, further spreading the pollution over the network. Whereas previous re-
search focused on malicious nodes identification schemes and pollution-resilient
coding, in this paper we show pollution countermeasures which make a standard
network coding scheme resilient to pollution attacks. Thanks to a simple yet ef-
fective analytical model of a reference node collecting packets by malicious and
honest neighbors, we demonstrate that i) packets received earlier are less likely to
be polluted and ii) short generations increase the likelihood to recover a clean gen-
eration. Therefore, we propose a recombination scheme where nodes draw packets
to be recombined according to their age in the input queue, paired with a decod-
ing scheme able to detect the reception of polluted packets early in the decoding
process and short generations. The effectiveness of our approach is experimentally
evaluated in a real system we developed and deployed on hundreds to thousands
peers. Experimental evidence shows that, thanks to our simple countermeasures,
the effect of a pollution attack is almost canceled and the video quality experienced
by the peers is comparable to pre-attack levels.
1 Introduction
Peer-to-peer (P2P) video streaming represents a mature area of research with several
successful examples to date [26, 11]. The combination of P2P and Network Coding
(NC) has recently received a great deal of attention from the research community as
an effective mechanism to aggregate user capacities and to increase system through-
put [9, 22, 21]. In NC-based architectures, the content is organized in independently
decodable data units (chunks or generations) and each chunk is further partitioned in
k blocks. The network nodes create linear combinations of suck blocks and produce
coded packets that are transmitted to the network. The packets can be spread in the
overlay network using a push approach, where at each transmission opportunity a new
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coded packet is generated by a peer and forwarded to a neighbor. On the receiver side, a
chunk can be decoded as soon as enough coded packets have been collected by solving
the system of linear equations corresponding to the collected packets.
Nonetheless, network coding systems are affected by a major Achille’s heel: they
are vulnerable to attacks carried out by nodes that spread bogus data over the network
with teh goal of disrupting the communication. These actions are commonly known as
pollution attacks [2, 20] and the attackers are termed as malicious nodes.
Several issues need to be addressed to design effective solutions to pollution attack
and the most part of the approaches proposed in the literature propose a two-steps
approach. First, some pollution detection mechanism is introduced to allow honest
peers to detect an ongoing pollution attack and, if possible, the source thereof. Second,
a proper reaction (e.g., blacklisting) is undertaken after the presence or the source of the
attack has been identified [23, 19, 13, 7, 6]. Both pollution detection and in particular
malicious nodes identification can be very complex tasks involving high computational
and/or communication overhead.
Our contribution
The key goal of this work is to exploit the degrees of freedom available in standard ran-
domNC to design a media streaming architecture that is inherently resilient to pollution
attacks. By comparison, most of the related literature focuses either on identification
and isolation of the malicious nodes or on designing ad-hoc data verification techniques
as discussed in Section 7. To this end, the contributions of this work are manifold:
• The main contribution is a novel packet recombination strategy where the nodes
draw the packets to recombine among those in the input buffers with a proba-
bility that grows with the age of the packet in the buffer. Our recombination
scheme dramatically reduces the probability that an honest node transmits a pol-
luted packet, which is further lowered by dividing the media stream in short
generations. By comparison, in traditional NC every packets are drawn for re-
combination with identical probability and the media stream is subdivided in
long generation to maximize the code efficiency. To put up with the somewhat
lower code efficiency of our recombination policy, we propose a simple heuristic
which restores the code efficiency to almost pre-attack levels and improves the
overall network utilization efficiency.
• Our findings are supported by an analytic model which enables to understand
how pollution propagates in a random NC push-based P2P system as a func-
tion of parameters such as generation size and time. Namely, we show that the
probability that a node forwards a polluted packet to downstream peers is not
constant, rather it grows with time, which justifies out age-based packet drawing
policy. Also, we show that the probability that a node recovers a clean gener-
ation depends on the generation size, i.e. short generations are more likely to
enable successful generation recovery. While our model relies on some simpli-
fying assumptions, yet it represents an adequate solution to qualitatively describe
the packet collection activity of a reference peer whose packets providers can be
either malicious or honest.
• Next, we present a probabilistic pollution detection mechanism which enables a
node to autonomously detect the presence of polluted packets in its input buffer
even if the node has not yet recovered the generation and without the need of
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external keys or hashing functions. We experimentally show that our pollution
detection scheme enables a node to detect pollution attacks earlier than a deter-
ministic scheme which relies on an external verification server, further throttling
the propagation of pollution through the network.
• Finally, the performance of our resilient-by-design pollution avoidance scheme is
throughly evaluated on a real, full-fledged, NC-based P2P video streaming pro-
tocol [4, 3] by streaming a live video sequence to one thousand peers. Thanks
to our realistic testbed, we are able to assess not only the reduction in the prop-
agated pollution entailed by our strategy, but also the effect thereof on the video
quality as perceived by the user in terms of continuity index, i.e., the fraction of
video frames correctly recovered.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we overview the basics of
multicast video distributionwith binary random network coding (NC); next in Section 3
we illustrate a simple pollution attack model and we analytically study the propagation
of the polluted packets through the network due to the recombinations at the nodes,
showing that packets received early by the nodes are less likely to be polluted and
small generations increase the probability to recover clean generations at the nodes. In
Section 4 the techniques that we propose to combat pollution are presented, namely an
algebraic detection mechanism based on Gaussian Elimination and a pollution resistant
NC coding strategy that recombines with higher probability those packets that are less
likely to be polluted. In Section 5 we overview ToroStream, a push-based protocol for
P2P video distribution via NC that we use for experimenting with our algorithms with
thousands of nodes in the following Section 6. The paper ends with Section 8 drawing
our conclusions and future research. Finally please note that, to easy the reader, we
collect in Tab. 1 all the key notation used throughout the paper.
2 Background
In this section we first overview a typical push-based NC scheme in an unstructured
mesh network detailing the operations at the network nodes. Next, we describe a sam-
ple pollution attack model based on the injection of bogus coded packets into the net-
work and we exemplify the spreading of the pollution through the network nodes.
2.1 Media Streaming with Network Coding
The source node holds a media content which is to be distributed to a set of cooperating
nodes which we assume are arranged into an unstructured, non-acyclic, mesh network
and operate according to a random-push model. The video is subdivided in chunks
of data called generations that are independently encoded and decoded at the network
nodes so to achieve finite playback delay. Each generation x is further subdivided into
k blocks of symbols (x1, ..., xk) (simply “blocks” in the following) of identical size,
where k is the generation size. Whereas a typical video sequence is subdivided in a
large number of generations, for the sake of simplicity in the following we assume that
the video sequence is composed by just one generation. Periodically, each node in the
network including the source is given a transmission opportunity: i.e., it is allowed to
transmit one packet to the network. Initially, only the source owns the original video
content and distributes it to the other nodes transmitting encoded packets as follows.
Let vector gi = (gi,1, ..., gi,k), gi,j ∈ GF (2) be the encoding vector associated to the
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NC parameters
k, k′ Generation size, num. pkts required to decode (k′ ≥ k)
xi i-th data block
Fi = (yi, gi) Coded packets (payload, encoding vector)
c = (c1, . . . cR) Recombination vector
pr Prob. each packet in input buffer is drawn for recombination
mr Minimum rank to start recombining
ǫc, Code overhead, ǫc = (k
′ − k)/k
Attack model
N ; Nh,Nm Tot. num. of nodes; Num. of honest, malicious nodes
ppoll Pollution probability of malicious nodes
rp Number of polluted packets received (rp ≤ k′)
ǫp, Pollution overhead, ǫp = rp/k
Analytical mode parameters
n Number of uploaders to reference node
x Number of malicious uploaders to reference node
P2P and experimental settings
Bv Test video bitrate
Ct Generation duration
tb Buffering time
Ns Maximum allowed neighborhood size
Bs, Bp Server, peer nodes bandwidth
Table 1: Key notation used in the paper.
i-th coded packet, where gi,j is selected such that P{gi,j = 1} =
1
2 ∀i. The source
produces a random linear combination on the original blocks as yi =
∑k
j=1 gi,jxj ,
where the sum operator represents the bit-wise XOR operator and yi is the i-th en-
coded payload. The node forwards the encoded packet Fi = (yi, gi), that contains the
encoded payload yi along with the corresponding encoding vector gi, to another node
drawn at random in the network.
The nodes of the network receive encoded packets, store them in an input buffer and
transmit random linear combinations thereof as follows at every transmission opportu-
nity. Let us assume that a node has received r packets (F1, ..., Fr): the node is allowed
to transmits a linear combination of the payloads of the received packets; the m-th
recombined packet is computed as yrm =
∑r
j=1 cm,jyj , where cm,j ∈ GF (2) and
P{cm,j = 1} = pr =
1
2 , i.e. each received packet is recombined with equal probabil-
ity. It turns out that the correspondingm-th encoding vectors is grm =
∑r
j=1 cm,jgj .
The result of the recombination is novel packet F rm(y
r
m, g
r
m) which is transmitted to
the outgoing link of the node. The recombinations at the nodes increase the likelihood
that the transmitted packet is linearly independent from all the packets previously col-
lected by the receiver, thus increasing the network goodput. Each time a node receives
a packet that is linearly independent from the previously received packets we say that
the packet is innovative. We call the number of linearly independent packets received
at any time by a node for the generation as the rank of the generation at the node: once
the rank is equal to k, we say that the generation has full rank. At this point, the node
solves the system of linear equations corresponding to the received packets (e.g., via
Gaussian elimination) and recovers the generation, i.e. the original video content.
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Figure 1: Toy network with a source andN=5 nodes whereNh=4 are honest andNm=1
(N3) is malicious. The generation is composed of k=4 blocks and the nodes input
buffers are represented at various decoding stages (polluted packets are represented in
dark gray).
In practical NC applications, a receiver must however typically collect k′ > k pack-
ets because not all received packets are innovative due to the random combinations and
forwarding. The penalty ǫ = k
′−k
k
is usually termed as code overhead and corresponds
to the ratio of network bandwidth wasted transmitting non innovative, hence useless,
packets .
2.2 Pollution Attack Model
Let us assume that the overlay of network nodes is composed by one source node and
N peer nodes, whereNh nodes are of the honest type andNm are of the malicious type
(Nh+Nm = N , whereNm << Nh) as depicted in Figure 1. Honest nodes recombine
the received packets as described in the previous section to allow as many other nodes
as possible to recover the generation. Malicious nodes disguise themselves among the
honest ones and attempt to disrupt the video communication by randomly transmitting
bogus coded data to the other network nodes. At each transmission opportunity, the
malicious node draws a random variable ψ ∈ {0, 1} with uniform probability so that
P{ψ = 1} = ppoll. If ψ = 0, the malicious node simply behaves as a honest one.
Otherwise if ψ = 1, the node generates a random encoding vector, a random encoded
payload and transmits the packet to the network node: in this case, we say that the
transmitted packet is polluted. Network nodes store the received packets in an input
buffer without knowing if the packet is polluted or not, as shown in Figure 1. Whenever
a transmission opportunity arises for a honest node, if any of the rp polluted packets in
its input buffer is drawn for recombination, then the transmitted packet is polluted too
and bogus data is propagated to the other network nodes.
In a scenario involving pollution attacks, we define as pollution overhead the ratio
ǫp =
rp
k
of network bandwidth wasted transmitting packets that are polluted, hence
useless. Along with the previously defined code overhead, the pollution overhead will
be used in this work to evaluate resources exploitation efficiency. In the example of
Figure 1, node N3 is malicious and has transmitted one polluted packet to N4, which
will not be able to correctly recover the generation. Then,N4 draws the polluted packet
for recombination and transmits one packet to N1: at this point also the input buffer of
N1 is polluted and the node will not be able to correctly recover the generation.
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Figure 2: Modeled scenario, where a reference node (middle of the picture, gray) re-
ceives packets from a set of uploaders, and transmits recombinations thereof to down-
stream nodes (malicious nodes are depicted in black).
3 Pollution Effects Model
In this section, we develop a simple analytical model to describe the behavior of a sam-
ple reference node that collects packets from a set of uploaders and combines them to
forward a new packet to downstream nodes. We show that the probability to correctly
recover a generation increases with small generations, whereas the probability of for-
warding a recombined polluted packet to downstream peers grows with time: these key
observations are the basis to devise our proposed pollution-resilient packet recombina-
tion scheme proposed in Sect. 4.2. Please note that we do not claim our model yields
accurate predictions on the effect of pollution attacks on a real system. Indeed, the
model is developed under several simplifying assumptions such as i) it describes the
behavior of a randomly chosen (reference) peer in the overlay network; ii) assumes that
the overlay topology is an unstructured mesh where nodes all lay at the same hierar-
chical level iii) packets transmission happen at discrete time slots termed as a rounds;
iv) during a round each uploader of the reference peer delivers a coded block. Never-
theless, the model includes all significant issues that determine the effect of polluting
packets (and the effect of recombining polluted packets) before transmitting them to
downstream peers as qualitatively (and, in part, quantitatively) experimentally verified
later on.
3.1 Modeling the Pollution Effects
To develop our model we consider a sample reference node that receives encoded pack-
ets from n uploaders nodes and forwards linear combinations thereof to other down-
stream nodes as illustrated in Figure 2 (the reference node is depicted in gray). We
assume that x out of n uploaders are malicious and purposely transmit bogus data as
described in Sect. 2.2. To simplify the model derivation, we assume that time is dis-
cretized in rounds; during one round each of the n uploaders delivers one packet to the
reference node and the reference node transmits one packet to one of the downstream
nodes.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that all packets received by a node are innova-
tive and the number of rounds required to recover the generation is equal to ⌈ k
n
⌉ + 1.
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The number of packets received by the reference node during the i-th round (1 ≤ i ≤
⌈ k
n
⌉+1) is denoted asR(i): under our assumptionsR(i) increases by n at each round,
hence R(i) = i · n.
We denote as Pp(i, x, b) the probability that b out of the n packets received at the
i-th round are polluted when x out of n uploaders are malicious. It is easy to show that
this probability follows a binomial distribution, i.e.,
Pp(i, x, b) =
(
ix
b
)
pbpoll(1− ppoll)
ix−b.
Please note that since in one round each uploader delivers exactly one packet, the max-
imum number of polluted packets that our reference node can collect is equal to ix.
During the i-th round, the reference node draws at random a subset of the R(i)
packets contained in its input buffer and combines them to generate a new packet to
forward to downstream nodes. We compute the probability that the packet recombined
by the reference node during the i-th round is polluted as
Prp(i, x) = 1−
ix∑
b=0
Pp(i, x, b)(1 − pr)
b. (1)
that is, one minus the probability the recombined packet is not polluted (this proba-
bility is computed as the probability that none of the polluted packets received by the
reference node has been selected for recombination).
We also assume the overlay network does not change with time and it is randomly
built. Under these assumptions, we describe the probability that x out of n uploaders
are malicious as an hyper-geometric distribution, i.e.,
Pmn(N,Nm, n, x) =
(
Nm
x
)(
N−Nm
n−x
)
(
N
n
) , (2)
We can thus compute the probability that the packet recombined by the reference
node during the i-th round is polluted as a weighted sum of(1), where the weights are
the probabilities that x out of n uploaders are malicious, i.e.,
Pgp(i, N,Nm, n) =
n∑
x=1
Pmn(N,Nm, n, x)Prp(i, x).
Therefore, the probability that the reference node does not draw for recombination
one of the polluted packets in its input buffer during any of the ⌈ k
n
⌉+1 rounds required
to recover the generation is equal to
Pfclean(k,N,Nm, n) =
⌈ k
n
⌉+1∏
i=1
1− Pgp(i, N,Nm, n). (3)
Finally, the probability that the reference node is able to recover a generationwhose
payload is not polluted is equal to
Prclean(k,N,Nm, n) =
n∑
x=0
Pmn(N,Nm, n, x)Pp(⌈
k
n
⌉+ 1, x, 0). (4)
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Figure 3: Probability that the packet transmitted by the reference node during the i-th
round is polluted (Pgp) as a function of time (k=100).
The first observation we make is based on Figure 3, which shows the probabil-
ity that the packet recombined by the reference node during the i-th round is polluted
(Pgp) as a function of the time (i.e., the round index i) for a simple scenario like the
one depicted in Figure 2 with N = 1000 nodes and Nm = 50 malicious nodes, where
each packet in the input buffer is recombined with probability pr = 0.5 and the prob-
ability that a malicious nodes transmits a polluted packet is equal to ppoll = 0.1. We
observe that the reference node forwards a polluted packet to its downstream peers with
a probability that increases with time: that is, packets forwarded later to downstream
nodes are more likely to be polluted. Therefore, downstream peers should draw for
recombination each packet received by the reference node with a probability that is di-
rectly proportional with the age of the packet in the buffer (i.e., packets received earlier
should be drawn for recombination with higher probability) rather than drawing each
packet with identical probability pr.
The second observation is that Equations (3) and (4) both depend on one system
parameter that can be controlled: the generation size k. Figure 4 shows that small
generations increase the probability to recover a clean generation and the probability
of forwarding clean packets to downstream nodes. Indeed, small generations reduce
the overall number of rounds required to recover a generation (please remind that the
number of rounds required by the reference node to recover the generationwas assumed
to be equal to ⌈ k
n
⌉+ 1 rounds). The definition of Pfclean is a product of probabilities,
hence the lower the number of factors the higher the final results. As for Prclean, we
note that ∀x, Pp(⌈
k
n
⌉+1, x, 0) = (1−ppoll)
(⌈ k
n
⌉+1)x that is a decreasing function of the
first argument that is equal to the overall number of rounds. Short generations bring
other advantages, such as reducing the computational complexity of recovering the
coded payload [3] and enabling low-delay communications by reducing the minimum
required buffering time [5], whereas a failure to timely recover a generation entails the
loss of fewer video frames. Note that, short generations also decrease the probability
that received packets are innovative and may negatively affect the code overhead ǫ.
However, as we experimentally demonstrate later on, small generations help reducing
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Figure 4: Probability that a node forwards a clean packet Pfclean and recovers a clean
generation Prclean as a function of generation size k.
the pollution overhead to the point where the total network overhead is lower than for
large generations. Also, in Sec. 4.2 we propose a simple heuristic that keeps the code
overhead under control by constraining the nodes to wait that a generation has reached
a minimum rank before they start to recombine and relay the received packets.
Concluding, the analysis of the results produced by our model suggest that:
• packets received earlier by a node are less likely to be polluted than the following
ones;
• the probability that a generation can be correctly recovered increases as the gen-
eration size k decreases;
• the probability that a node transmits a polluted recombined packet decreases as
the generation size k decreases.
Such findings represent the cornerstones of the pollution-resilient NC architecture de-
scribed in the following section.
4 Proposed Algorithms
In this section, we first describe a pollution detection scheme designed around On-
the-Fly Gaussian elimination [1] that allows a node to spot the presence of a polluted
packet in the input buffer even before the generation is recovered. Next, we present a
packet recombination scheme that minimizes the likelihood that the packet transmitted
by a node is polluted by exploiting the knowledge unveiled by the model proposed in
Sect. 3.1.
4.1 Pollution Detection and Decoding
A basic feature of a pollution resilient NC P2P streaming application is the capability
to detect that bogus data are being spread by unknownmalicious peers. Fortunately, we
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can exploit the NC decoding procedure, along with the fact that every node is likely to
get some redundant (non innovative) packets from its neighbors, to obtain a pollution
detection mechanism at generation-level. In other words, the algorithm described in the
following paragraph allows every node to detect if a generation that is being decoded
is under attack, albeit it cannot trace the pollution source. We point out that that no
ancillary data or infrastructure for verification are required and pollution detection is
operated on the fly using only the received coded packets. The algorithm operates in
two stages, detection and decoding, that are detailed and described each in pseudo-code
below.
The detection stage serves the purpose of revealing the presence of a polluted
packet among those received by the node and detect whether received packets are in-
novative or not. The detection stage is formalized as Algorithm 1 and it is executed
every time a new packet Fi = (yi, gi) is received by the node. In the following to
avoid cluttering the notation we will drop the packet index using notation F = (y, g)
to refer a generic received packets. Each time a node receives a packet, a copy of it
is also stored in an input buffer for further recombination as described later on in this
section. The NC decoding process [1] can be represented as a solution to a system of
k linear equations GX = Y , where G is a k × k upper-triangular matrix that stores
(linear combinations of) the encoding vectors of the received packets, Y is the k × 1
vector that stores the corresponding encoded payloads y andX is the k× 1 vector that
contains the symbols xi to recover, which are initially unknown. In the following, we
use the notation Gi to indicate the i-th row of G and we use the notation Gi,j to indi-
cate the element ofG at row i, column j. When all the elements ofGi and Yi are equal
to zero, we say that the the i-th row of G and the i-th element are empty and we write
Gi = ∅. Let s be the index of the leading one of g, i.e. the first non-zero element of g
such that gi = 0 ∀i < s: the maximum number of iterations of the while cycle at line
2 of the algorithm is equal to s. Depending on whetherGs = ∅, the algorithm operates
as follows. If Gs is empty, g is inserted in the s-th row of G, y is inserted in the s-th
position of Y and the algorithm ends reporting an innovative packet was received (line
6). Otherwise, a comparison between Gs and g is performed. If g = Gs, the received
packet P (g, y) and the pair (Gs, Ys) are expected to represent the same combination
of the input symbols, thus the encoded payloads should match as well, i.e. it should
be y = Ys. This event occurs every time the packet being processed is linearly depen-
dent on the ones received previously and it is likely to happen due to random coding,
recombination and forwarding that imply the collection of k′ > k coded packets to
complete decoding. Therefore using the non innovative packet, a sanity check is per-
formed comparing y with Ys: if they differ, then one or more packets received so far
in the corresponding generation must be polluted and the algorithm returns reporting
the presence of at least one polluted packet in the input buffer (line 9). Otherwise, if
payloads are identical, packet F is likely to be correct but it is not helpful to recover the
generation, so it is discarded and the algorithm returns reporting the received packet is
not innovative (line 11). If otherwise g 6= Gs, the algorithm performs a bitwise XOR
between g and Gs and between y and Ys (line 12): such XOR has the effect to set to
zero the s-th element of the encoding vector, i.e. it sets gs = 0, and the while cycle
iterates unless any of the previously described termination is verified or gi = 0, ∀i.
The second stage, recovery, is executed when the rank of G is equal to k, i.e. after
k linearly independent packets have been received. Recovering the generation sim-
ply entails transforming the upper-triangular matrixG as arranged during the detection
stage to diagonal form by means of standard backward-substitution. Algorithm 1 can
be invoked each time a packet is received at the node, either before or after the genera-
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Algorithm 1 Pollution detection with Gaussian elimination
1: receive F = (y, g).
2: while true do
3: s← position of leading one of g.
4: if Gs = ∅ then
5: Gs ← g ; Ys ← y
6: end
7: else
8: if g = Gs then
9: if y 6= Ys then
10: pollution detected; end;
11: else
12: useless packet; end
13: end if
14: else
15: g ← g ⊕Gs; y ← y ⊕ Ys
16: end if
17: end if
18: end while
tion has been decoded (due to the nature of push networks, nodes are likely to receive
encoded packets also after they have recovered the generation). In the following, we
call early packets received before the generation has been recovered; conversely, we
call late packets received afterwards. If the algorithm is invoked to process early pack-
ets, we say that we have a case of early pollution detection; otherwise, if the algorithm
is invoked to process late packets, we talk about late pollution detection. In this latter
case, late packets are exploited to double check whether any of the packets received
so far was polluted. Note that when Algorithm 1 returns a detected pollution flag, it is
up to the node to decide how to exploit such information, for example during packet
recombinations as described below.
4.2 Packet Recombination at the Network Nodes
In this section we propose a packet recombination scheme that aims at reducing the
probability that a packet forwarded by a node is polluted by exploiting the finding that
packets received earlier are less likely to be polluted. Let us assume that a node has
received r packets at the moment it is granted a transmission opportunity, and such
packets are stored in a FIFO buffer as {F1, . . . , Fi, . . . , Fr}, so that Fi was received
prior to packet Fi+1. Each i-th packet is drawn for recombination according to packet
recombination probability pr(i, θ) that now we let depend on the packet index i; in par-
ticular, we propose to use the following truncated negative exponential density function
pr(i, θ, α) =
iα∑θ
j=1 j
α
, (5)
where α is the parameter of the exponential and θ is the cutoff parameter.
Now, the recombination vector c = (c1, . . . cr), ci ∈ {0, 1} defined in Sect. 2, is
obtained by throwing ci as
11
ci =
{
1 if pr(i, θ, α) < ρ
0 otherwise
where ρ ∈ [0, 1] is drawn with uniform probability. The encoding vector of the recom-
bined packet is then computed as gr =
∑r
i=1 cig
i, whereas the corresponding payload
is computed as yr =
∑r
i=1 ciy
i and finally packet F r = (yr, gr) can be forwarded to
the neighbors. Note that while the proposed scheme exploits the finding that packets
received earlier are less likely to be polluted, we do not advocate that it globally mini-
mizes the probability to transmit a polluted packet and we leave further improvements
for future works.
Note that changing the recombination probability from a completely random one
(pr = 1/2) to the time dependent function pr(i, θ) may impair the coding overhead ǫc
defined in Sect. 2. In fact, drawing for recombination elder packets with higher proba-
bility limits the set of received packets that are recombined, decreasing the probability
to create innovative packets. To counter act this issue, we impose a minimum number
of linearly independent packets mr that a node must have received for a generation
before it is allowed to start forward linear combinations thereof. At any time mr is
equal to the rank of matrixG in Algorithm 1 and allows us to put a lower bound on the
cardinality of the set of packets used to generate novel recombinations.
5 The ToroStream P2P Protocol
In this section we overview the key aspects of ToroStream, a P2P protocol for live
video streaming with NC that we use to evaluate our algorithms for pollution-resilient
NC; a detailed description of the protocol can be found in our previous works [4, 3],
from which we borrow the terminology. Whereas in this work we use ToroStream to
evaluate our proposed algorithms, in principle our algorithms can be applied to any
NC-based P2P push or pull protocol.
5.1 Topology Setup and Management
Peer nodes are arranged into an unstructured, non-acyclic, mesh to minimize the topol-
ogymanagement effort and increase the resilience to network failures. A central tracker
keeps track of all the nodes in the network: whenever a node wants to join the network,
it contacts the tracker which replies to the node with a list of nodes already in the net-
work drawn at random. After a handshake, two nodes become neighbors and start to
periodically exchange keepalive messages: if a node does not receive keepalive mes-
sages from a neighbors for too long, the neighborhood relationship is terminated with
an appropriate message. The maximum size of the neighborhood of a node is upper
bounded byNs so to maintain the network topology sparse and to minimize the related
signaling and management overhead. Also, periodically each node drops at random
one or more nodes from its neighborhood to refresh the network topology.
5.2 Signaling Protocol
The server subdivides the video stream, which we assume encoded at constant bit rate
Bv, into a sequence of independently recoverable generations of identical playout du-
ration Ct and approximately the same number k of blocks of size Cs each. Every Ct
seconds, the server parses one generation of video from a video bitstream, subdivides
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the generation in k blocks of symbols where the exact k depends on the actual size of
the video unit1 and distributes random linear combinations thereof to all its neighbors.
The generation currently distributed by the server is called the server position in the
following. When a node joins the network, buffers tb seconds of video first, which
correspond to tb/Ct generations, before playing out the generation with the earliest
playout deadline in the stream. The generation currently reproduced at the node is
called here the node playback position; generations encompassed between the server
position (included) and the playout position of a node (excluded) form the decoding
region of the node. Each node lets know its neighbors which generation within its own
decoding region have already been recovered and which have not to its neighbors ap-
pending to all transmitted packets a vector of tb/Ct bits known as decoding map which
represents the decoding status of the generation within the node decoding region.
5.3 Packet Scheduling and Pollution Avoidance Policy
The server and the nodes distribute encoded packets with a random-push mechanism
under a limited output bandwidth constraint as follows. The server is allocated a max-
imum output bandwidth Bs: periodically, the server transmits a random linear combi-
nation of the blocks that compose the generation at the server position in the stream,
where the transmission period is given by Bs/Ct. The network nodes receive encoded
packets which are processed for pollution detection and decoded as described in the
the previous section and implemented as follows. Each time a node receives a packet,
it stores a copy thereof in a separate input buffer for each generation in its decoding
region. Next, the packet is processed for pollution detection with Algorithm 1: if the
algorithm detects pollution, the corresponding generation is flagged as polluted. The
node keeps track of the status of each generation within its own decoding region with a
vector of tb/Ct bits called pollution vector, where each position of the vector is equal
to one if any of the packets received for that generation was detected as polluted, 0
otherwise. The pollution vector also drives the packet recombination mechanism of
the network nodes as below. At each transmission opportunity, a node draws at random
a node among its neighbors, checks the last decoding map received by that neighbor
and performs a binary AND operation between the neighbor decoding map and its own
pollution vector. If all elements of the resulting vector are equal to 0, no generation is
suitable for transmission either because at least one of the packets in the correspond-
ing input buffer is polluted at the node or because the neighbor has already recovered
the generation. Otherwise, the node draws the generation suitable for recombination
that is closer to the decoding deadline and recombines the received packet in the corre-
sponding input buffer according to the algorithm described in the previous section and
transmits the packet.
6 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the pollution detection and packet recombination schemes
proposed in Section 4 thorogh the random-push P2P protocol described in the previous
section using a 64-cores server equipped with 128 GB of memory which hosts thou-
sands of peers enbaling packet losses free experimentsing. We consider a network of
N = 1000 nodes with Nh=980 honest nodes and Nm=20 malicious nodes, where the
1In motion compensated hybrid video coding a simple way to recognize independently playable coding
unit is always defined, and constitutes the so called group of pictures (GOP).
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neighborhood of each node is restricted toNs = 25 nodes. A 300 seconds test sequence
encoded at Cv = 500 kbit/s is distributed by a source node whose output bandwidth is
equal toBs = 20Mbit/s, whereas the output bandwidth of the peer nodes is constrained
to Bp = 750 kbit/s. Peers implement the pollution detections scheme described in Sec-
tion 4: whenever a polluted packet is detected, the node stops transmitting packets for
such generation to avoid further spreading the pollution. All nodes enter the network
at the same time (t = 0 s) and leave the network at the same time t = 300 s. Malicious
nodes randomly alter the payload of each transmitted packet as described in Section
2.2 and with probability ppoll during the interval [90, 210] s (attack interval), whereas
they behave as honest nodes, i.e. packets are altered with probability ppoll=0 for the
rest of the experiment. A generation is considered correctly recovered by a peer node
if the node could timely recover the generation (i.e., if the node could receive at least
k independent packets) prior to its playout deadline and none of the received packets
is actually polluted. The quality of the video delivered to a node is measured in terms
of Continuity Index (CI), which is defined as the fraction of generations that could be
correctly recovered prior to the respective playout deadlines.
6.1 Verifying the Pollution Model
First, we verify the pollution model proposed in 2.2 by sampling the actual distribution
of malicious nodes among a node neighborhood. We experiment in the above described
scenario withN=1000 nodes, where each node has a neighborhood composed of n=25
other peers. Figure 5 shows the expected and actual distribution of the probability that
x out of n uploaders are malicious for different neighborhood sizes Nm ∈ [10, 30, 50]
nodes are of the malicious type. We clearly see that probability that x out of n nodes
are malicious follows an hyper-geometric distribution, as modeled in Eq. 2.
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Figure 5: Probability that x out of n nodes are malicious forNm = 10 (left), 30 (center),
50 (right) nodes.
6.2 Effect of pollution attack on video quality
Then, we study the effect of a pollution attack for the reference NC architecture de-
scribed in Section 2, where the peers recombine each received packet with probability
pr =
1
2 , malicious nodes alter the payload of transmitted packets with probability
ppoll=0.01 during the attack interval and the video stream is subdivided in generations
of k=50 blocks. In this setup, the amount of packets purposely polluted by the mali-
cious nodes amounts to about 0.02% of the packets exchanged in the network. Figure 6
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shows the CI over time (each point in the graph corresponds to one generation). During
the time interval [0, 90) no polluted packets are injected in the network by the malicious
nodes and so the CI is equal to 1, i.e. all nodes decode the video without interruptions.
At time t=90 s, the 20 malicious nodes start injecting polluted packets for the follow-
ing 120 seconds: during this interval, the CI drops from 1 to about 0.1.Finally, at time
t=210 s, malicious nodes cease transmitting polluted packets and the average CI rises
again to 1 for the remaining 90 seconds of the experiment. The CI averaged over the
whole streaming session is equal to 0.628, whereas the average CI during the attack
interval is equal to 0.111, i.e. about 9 generations out of ten cannot be correctly recov-
ered due to the pollution attack. A few malicious nodes are able to completely disrupt
the communication by randomly altering less than 1% of the overall network traffic,
showing the need for countermeasures to pollution attacks.
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Figure 6: The video quality at the nodes drops in the 90∼210 s interval due to the
polluted packets transmitted by the malicious nodes.
6.3 Effect of pollution detection scheme
First, we explore the effect of the pollution detection scheme on the probability that a
honest node transmits a polluted packet further spreading the pollution in the network.
For this experiment, we consider the same reference packet recombination scheme as
in the previous experiment and two different schemes for pollution detection. The first
scheme, OFG, is our scheme described in Section 4.1 where we exploit the OFG al-
gorithm to verify if received packets are polluted even before the generation has not
been recovered yet. The second scheme, Checksum, is an ideal strategy where the node
recovers a generation, computes a checksum thereof and compares it with a reference
checksum stored on a trusted server with unlimited bandwidth and zero latency. When-
ever pollution is detected for one generation, the nodes drop all received packets and
stop relaying packets for that generation.
Figure 7 shows the probabilityPtp that the i-th packet transmitted by a node is polluted.
The checksum scheme guarantees that a pollution attack is always detected at the mo-
ment a generation is recovered; however nodes must first recover the generation and
only afterwards stop relaying polluted packets. Conversely, our scheme provides no
guarantee that a pollution attack is detected, however it can potentially detect pollution
attacks and stop relying polluted packets earlier on. Therefore, our OFG-based pollu-
tion detection is more effective that a checksum server-based reference in reducing the
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probability to relay polluted packets, plus nodes do not need to rely on a centralized
checksum server with all the related issues.
Moreover, we see that Ptp is not constant, instead it grows over time with i as predicted
by our model and as shown in Figure 3, proving the qualitative correctness of the find-
ings yield by our time-slotted model.
This experiment shows that our OFG-based pollution detection scheme reduces the
probability that an honest node relays a polluted packet, thus in all following experi-
ments the nodes always implement our OFG-based pollution detection strategy.
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Figure 7: Probability Ptp that the i-th packet transmitted by a node is polluted for
different pollution detection strategies.
6.4 Effect of packet recombination strategy
Next, we study the probability that a node receives a polluted packet as a function of
the packet recombination strategy at the nodes. The first recombination scheme we
consider is the same Reference strategy used in previous experiments. The second
scheme, Proposed, is our recombination scheme described in Section 4, where each
i-th packet in the input buffer is drawn for recombination with a probability pr(i, θ)
that increases with the packet position i in the buffer, i.e. with its age, as in Equation 5
(in our experiments, we set α = 1). Unless stated in the following we use the proposed
recombination algorithm withmr = 1, i.e. we do not put a constraint on the rank of the
decoding matrix G. Figure 8 shows the probability Ptp that the i-th packet transmitted
by a node is polluted. With the reference packet recombination strategy, the probability
that a node transmits a polluted packet quickly soars to about 0.8, i.e. almost 80% of the
packets in the network are polluted by the time the generation is recovered. Note that
malicious nodes alter only about 0.02% of the overall number of packets transmitted in
the network, that is the reference strategy is responsible for an increase in the pollution
rate of about 3 orders of magnitude. Conversely, our proposed recombination scheme
enables a Ptp (about 0.12%) which is two orders of magnitude lower than the reference
scheme as packets received earlier, which are less likely to be polluted, are more likely
to be drawn for recombination.
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Figure 8: Probability Ptp that the i-th packet transmitted by a node is polluted for
different packet recombination strategies.
6.5 Effect of generation size
Next, in Figure 9 we evaluate the joint effect of the packet recombinations scheme and
generation size k on the probability that an honest node transmits a polluted packet Ptp
and on the CI and the relationship between the two. Independently from the considered
recombination algorithm, small k yield lower Ptp and thus higher CI as expected from
Equation 4. However, just reducing k is not sufficient to set off the pollution effects, and
our packet recombination strategy is the key element in achieving near-optimal video
quality. This experiments clearly demonstrates the relationship between the probability
that a node transmits a polluted packet and the probability that the node is able to
recover the generation. In the following experiments, we experiment with the pollution
attack model to assess the resilience of our scheme to an increased activity of the the
malicious nodes.
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Figure 9: Probability to transmit a polluted packet and corresponding video quality as
a function of generation size k for different packet recombination schemes.
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6.6 Effect of packet pollution probability
Figure 10 shows the CI as a function of the probability ppoll that a packet transmitted
by a malicious node is and for different packet recombination schemes and genera-
tion sizes k ∈ {25, 50} (in all previous experiments we had ppoll = 0.01). As ppoll
increases, the CI drops to zero for the reference scheme, independently from k (the
larger k, the sharper the drop however). Conversely, with our recombination scheme
the video quality degrades gracefully despite a tenfold increase in the number of pol-
luted packets transmitted to the network by the malicious nodes. As expected, best
video quality is achieved when the proposed scheme is paired with smaller genera-
tions, albeit the largest contribution to pollution resilience is given by the our packet
recombination algorithm.
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Figure 10: Video quality as a function of malicious nodes packet pollution probability
for different packet recombination schemes and values of generation size k.
6.7 Effect of number of malicious nodes
In Figure 11, we investigate the relationship between video quality and number of
malicious nodesNm present in the network. As Nm increases, the video quality drops
to zero with the reference scheme, and reducing the generation size from k = 50 to
k = 25 only marginally improves the performance. Conversely, our proposed scheme
allows a graceful degradation of the video quality as the number of malicious nodes in
the network increases; moreover, small generations further improve the video quality.
Since the previous experiments confirm that the proposed recombination scheme paired
with small generations yields best video quality, in the following we mainly focus on
such combination of experimental parameters.
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Figure 11: Video quality as a function of the number of malicious nodes in the network
for different packet recombination schemes and values of generation size k.
6.8 Video Quality vs. Network Overhead Tradeoff
Having shown that our proposed recombination scheme (with the help of small gener-
ations) sets off a pollution attack effect to the point where the video can be recovered
almost seamless, now we focus on the impact of the recombination scheme and gen-
eration size on the network overhead. We recall that we define as code overhead ǫc
the ratio of network bandwidth wasted transmitting non innovative packets; also the
pollution overhead ǫp was defined as the ration of network bandwidth wasted trans-
mitting polluted packets: the sum thereof is the total overhead, i.e. the overall ratio
of wasted network bandwidth. Figure 12 shows, from left to right, the code, pollution
and total overhead for three generation sizes k and our packet recombination strategies
plus the reference scheme. As expected, short generations yield higher code overhead,
regardless of the recombination scheme (left figure). However, short generations help
reducing the pollution overhead, plus our recombination scheme almost nullifies the
pollution overhead as the central figure shows. Therefore, as the right figure demon-
strates, our proposed strategy yields a total overhead that is not higher than the corre-
sponding overhead for the reference strategy even when generations are short, albeit it
yields huge improvements in terms of video quality.
Next, we investigate the video quality vs network overhead tradeoff as a function of
two parameters of our packet recombination strategy. In previous experiments, network
nodes were allowed to start forwarding linear combinations of the received packets as
soon as at least one packet was in the input buffer, i.e. mr = 1: we now experiment
with mr=2, i.e. nodes are allowed to transmit packets for a generation only if at least
two linearly independent packets were received. Moreover, in the previous experiments
the α parameters in Eq. 5 which controls the number of recombined packets for our
proposed strategy was set to 1.0, i.e. we had α=1.0: we now explore how the α pa-
rameter affects the performance of our scheme. Figure 13 shows the tradeoff between
continuity index and total overhead, for the case k=25 and for the casemr=1 (top) and
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As previously seen, the reference strategy yields the largest pollution overhead, result-
ing in large total overhead and poor CI. As α decreases from 1 to 0.5, more packets
are recombined, thus the probability to recombine innovative packets increases and
the code overhead drops while the CI is only marginally affected. By comparing the
top and bottom figures, we see that if nodes wait to receive a few independent packet
before starting to relay, the code overhead drops independently form the considered
recombination strategy. In detail, this experiments shows that by controlling the α and
mr parameters, we can further boost the performance of our strategy to achieve nearly
optimal video quality and half the network overhead of the reference scheme.
7 Related Works
As already pointed out in Sect. 1, to the best of our knowledge the present paper is the
first to face the P2P pollution problem from a novel point of view, namely building a
NC based P2P streaming application intrinsically resilient to the attack. Therefore, the
goal here has been to mitigate as far as possible the effect of pollution, by leveraging on
innovative use of the the NC decoder for pollution detection and by designing a novel
pollution resistant recombination strategy.
Many research studies have proposed techniques to defend peer-to-peer streaming
systems from pollution attacks following different strategies aiming at identifying ma-
licious peers in order to remove them from the network. Clearly, such approaches are
potentially the best solution to the the pollution problem; nonetheless, malicious up-
loaders identification is very complex issue in random push NC based applications and
the proposed techniques are usually limited by the number of polluters they can face
or in terms of added computational complexity and/or communication overhead. In
the following we provide a quick review of the related studies limited to the area of
network coding.
Several efforts have been devoted to devise on-the-fly verification techniques car-
ried out by participants [17, 8, 18, 14, 25, 15, 24]. These works are based on either
cryptographic or algebraic approaches. The major drawback of these elegant methods
is the high computational costs for verification and the communication overhead due
to pre-distribution of verification information. Pre-distribution of verification keys is
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Figure 13: Tradeoff between video quality and network overhead for mr=1 (top) and
mr=2 (bottom). For the proposed recombination strategies, three α values are consid-
ered (default in previous experiments is α = 1).
particularly critical in case of live streaming where novel data are being forwarded at
a high rate. Error correction is another approach to deal with pollution attacks in net-
work coding based peer-to-peer streaming [10, 12, 16]; these methods introduce coding
redundancy to allow receivers to correct errors but their effectiveness depends on the
amount of corrupted information.
In [19] a fully distributed detection algorithm based on a stochastic approach is pre-
sented. The technique uses intersection operations to progressively isolate malicious
peers in the set of neighbors of a peer. The main drawback of the approach is that
it works only under the (unrealistic) assumption that the neighbors remain the same
and that each chunk is obtained by a randomly chosen subset thereof. In [7, 6] ma-
licious nodes identification is treated as an statistical inference problem relaying on
control information termed check created by peers upon completing decoding of every
chunk. Also in this case the additional communication and computational costs are
needed. Moreover, as in all statistical approaches the identification may fail leading to
expungement of honest peers.
Finally, it is worth noticing that all previous approaches are exposed to the so called
sybil attack, where malicious nodes try to escape identification by changing their iden-
tity at a pace higher than the identification mechanism rate.
In the area of P2P file sharing, the injection of bogus data by untrusted peers has
been traditionally tackled using data authentication. In particular, a security hash,e.g.
SHA1, can be computed for each data block in order to recognize malicious modifi-
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cations on the receiver side. Such approach must rely on a trusted infrastructure and
protocol to distribute hashes to all peers in the network. Indeed, if the hashes distribu-
tion is not secure, malicious nodes can recompute and update the hash of a modified
data to hide out. Whilst being a viable approach for pull-based file sharing application
such as BitTorrent, data hashing can not extended to video streaming where real time
computation and distribution of the verification data cannot be easily guaranteed.
8 Conclusions and future work
In this paper we proposed simple countermeasures for mitigating the effects of pollu-
tion attacks in NC-based video streaming. First, we model the diffusion of the polluted
packets through the network due to the recombinations at the nodes: our analysis sug-
gest that packets received earleier by a node are less likely to be polluted, while the
chances that node recovers a clean generation decrease with the generation size. On
the basis of such findings, we devise a packet recombination scheme where packets are
drawn with a probability that grows with the packet age in the nodes input queues. Our
experiments with P2P video streaming shows that, in a traditional NC context, a hand-
ful of malicious nodes can completely disrupt the video quality just by injecting a few
polluted packets in the network. Conversely, our proposed packet recombination algo-
rithm, paired with small generations, makes the communication significantly robust to
the activity of malicious nodes, which need to inject many more polluted packets in
the network before the video quality strats to drop. Our experiments also suggest that
increased malicious nodes activity is the premise for devising effective mechanisms for
detecting the malicious nodes and isolating them from the network, which we leave as
future work.
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